Published in Standard-Examiner, November 16, 2014, Ogden, Utah
VIJAY K. MATHUR
In part 1 of my
column I discussed the
Federal Reserve’s (Fed) structure, its responsibilities and implementation of
monetary policy, independent of political interference. Here, I discuss
different views (of Monetarist and Keynesian schools) on the conduct of
monetary policy and the issue of the Fed’s independence from political
pressures.
First some
background. One of the conclusions arrived at by Professor Ben Bernanke, former
Fed chairman, in his path-breaking book “The Great Depression,” is that in all
countries monetary contraction was the major cause of the Great Depression of
the 1930s. Even with widespread bank panics, sharp price decreases, and output
and employment contraction, monetary policy was circumscribed by the prevailing
gold standard. Countries that abandoned the gold standard had greater
flexibility in initiating expansionary monetary policy (U.S. after 1933) to
provide liquidity to banks and stabilize prices, hence output and employment.
Bank panics significantly affected supply of output.
Congress
created an independent Fed in 1913 to avoid financial panics before World War
I. The Fed faced the most severe test in the Great Depression. Some
conservative politicians and economists have questioned the Fed’s independence
and its discretionary monetary policy.
Nobel
Laureate conservative economist Milton Friedman (now deceased), leader of the
Monetarist school, argued that discretionary monetary policy could be
destabilizing to the economy in the short run. This could happen due to time
lags in gathering information and uncertainty about the monetary policy’s
effect on the economy. In the long run, monetary policy could be more effective
in stabilizing prices. Friedman argued that a rule-based policy, such as a
target rate of growth in money supply, is more credible and creates more
certainty in markets, thus creating price stability in the long run and
encouraging firms to increase output and employment. It is ironic that Friedman
was fearful of political pressures on the Fed on its decisions.
Perhaps
those politicians who wish to have more control over monetary policy do not
like the discretionary nature of the Fed’s policies pursued in the Great
Recession of 2007-2009 or their quest for control may be guided by Friedman’s
views on monetary policy.
An activist
monetary policy for the short run is the Taylor Rule, proposed by Stanford
University Professor John Taylor. Andrew Abel, Ben Bernanke and Dean Croushore
argue that the Taylor Rule establishes interest rate, rather than money supply,
as an intermediate target of monetary policy to provide economic stimulus.
The rule
states that the inflation-adjusted federal funds rate (real interest rate)
responds to the difference between actual output and full-employment output and
the difference between the actual inflation rate and the target inflation
(considered to be 2 percent) rate. Therefore, if the economy is at full
employment output and actual inflation rate is 2 percent the Fed should set the
real interest rate at 2 percent. It should decrease the real interest rate
below 2 percent if the economy is weak and increase it above 2 percent if the
economy is overheating.
Keynesians
recommend a flexible and activist monetary policy, depending upon the state of
the economy. Monetary policy could be effectively used not only to stabilize
prices but also to promote growth and employment. The Fed followed the Taylor
Rule as a guide to achieve its goals in the short run. To make the economy grow
in the long run it followed quantitative easing (QE). QE provides liquidity by
buying assets such as government securities (Treasuries) and private sector
securities. The Fed recently ended QE due to a pick up in economic growth;
however, it would keep short-term interest rates very low for the near future.
Total
attention of many conservatives to inflation rate is unwarranted. The Federal
Reserve Bank Act of 1978 requires the goal of full employment. Despite the
limited role played by tax and expenditure policies to combat the recent Great
Recession, monetary policy had been very effective in boosting employment and
growth, and in controlling the inflation rate.
The
inflation rate now is hovering around the target of 2 percent. The current
unemployment rate of 5.9 percent is close to full employment unemployment rate,
and the U.S. is the only advanced country experiencing potential economic
growth of 3.5 percent. Had Congress enacted robust tax and expenditure
policies, the unemployment rate and growth would have been even better.
Congress even ignored the advice of Professor Bernanke as Fed chair, on fiscal
policy in his 2013 testimony in the Senate committee. Political debates and
dysfunction in Congress undermined prospects for timely action on fiscal
policy. Control of Fed’s monetary policy by politicians, feared by Professor Milton
Friedman, will not establish the Fed’s credibility.
The study of
16 advanced countries by Professors Alberto Alesiena and Lawrence Summers found
lower average inflation rates in countries with greater independence of central
banks. Effectiveness of monetary policy would be compromised with more
political intervention and supervision than what we have now.
Congress
would be more productive if it settles on certain principles of its own to
guide debt, tax and expenditure decisions in a timely manner to deal with
recessions and inflation episodes, rather than being mired in endless political
debates and indecisions.